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Heterogeneity in the response of banks to a change in monetary policy is an important 
element in the transmission of this policy through banks. This paper examines the role of 
bank liquidity, capitalization and market power as internal factors influencing banks’ reaction 
in terms of lending and risk-taking to monetary policy impulses. The ultimate impact of a 
monetary policy change on bank performance is also considered. The empirical analysis, 
using large panel datasets for the United States and the euro area, elucidates the sources of 
differences in the response of banks to changes in policy interest rates by disaggregating 
down to the individual bank level. This is achieved by the use of a Local GMM technique 
that also enables us to quantify the degree of heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism. It 
is argued that the extensive heterogeneity in banks’ response identifies overlooked 
consequences of bank behavior and highlights potential monetary sources of the current 
financial distress.   
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This paper analyzes empirically the heterogeneous response of US and euro area 
banks over the period 1994-2007 in terms of their lending and risk-taking decisions 
following a monetary policy change. The ultimate impact of a monetary policy 
change on bank performance is also considered. In our empirical strategy, the 
heterogeneous effects of monetary policy stem from a number of bank characteristics, 
namely liquidity, capitalization and market power. 
More specifically, using a method that identifies parameter heterogeneity at the 
bank level, this paper aims to (i) add to the limited literature that considers the effect 
of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and profitability and, more importantly, (ii) 
analyze and quantify the heterogeneous response of banks following a change in 
monetary policy.  
To carry out these tasks we resort to a local generalized method of moments 
(LGMM) technique. This technique considers the estimation of a dynamic panel data 
model, in which it allows the estimated coefficients to directly vary according to the 
smooth coefficient model. The smooth coefficient model lets the marginal effect of 
the monetary policy variable to be an unknown function of observable bank 
characteristics and hence introduces heterogeneity directly in the marginal effect of a 
monetary policy change. Also, by “localizing” observations, this method provides 
observation-specific estimates of the impact of monetary policy on bank balance 
sheets. Therefore, heterogeneous bank behavior is identified at the bank level and is 
actually measured by the variance of the distribution of estimated coefficients. 
Three different equations are considered, corresponding to a loan, a credit risk and 
a profitability model. The specification of the first equation follows previous studies 
of the bank lending channel, but its estimation also allows for quantification of 
heterogeneity. The other two equations provide novel results for the extent of 
heterogeneity in the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking and profitability. 
The bank characteristics serving as the smoothing variables are chosen to be liquidity, 
capitalization and market power of banks. For the market power variable a number of 
reasons are provided on why it is preferred to size, while its measurement is based on 
a recent technique that allows obtaining estimates at the bank level. The choice of the 
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The average value reported for the coefficient of the monetary policy variable in 
the lending equations is negative and statistically significant regardless of which 
smoothing variable is used. We also find that monetary policy changes cause a very 
different response of bank lending on the basis of their capital structures, with more 
capitalized banks (i.e. those on the right end of the distribution) responding less to 
monetary policy changes. The same and even more pronounced in terms of variance 
are the results obtained when the distributional characteristic is the market power 
variable. In particular, high capitalization and market power tend to buffer the 
negative impact on bank lending of a shift in policy rates. 
The results for the risk equations indicate that credit risk is highly persistent and 
that the monetary policy variable has on average a negative and marginally significant 
coefficient. For banks with higher liquidity and capitalization the impact of a 
monetary policy change on credit risk is close to zero. However, there also exist some 
banks in the sample that seem to take on extra risk following an increase in policy 
rates (i.e. many coefficients are positive). This implies that higher liquidity and, 
primarily, capitalization induce some banks in light of e.g. a contractionary monetary 
policy to continue promoting risk-taking activities despite the fact that funding 
becomes more expensive. Such behavior could eventually lead to the erosion of the 
liquidity and/or capital base of these banks and in turn to deterioration in the health of 
their balance sheets in the face of a credit crunch. 
Finally, estimates of the profitability equations indicate that the average 
coefficient on the monetary policy variable is not statistically significant and takes a 
value very close to zero in all specifications. Yet, heterogeneity of the coefficients is 
quite large, especially when the monetary policy variable is smoothed by 
capitalization and market power. Therefore, it seems that banks with higher (lower) 
levels of equity capital and market power benefit (lose) from a contractionary 
monetary policy. 
An obvious immediate extension of this work is to use measures of heterogeneity 
to assess the effect of monetary policy on real output. If, in addition, more 
disaggregate bank-level data on loans is available, an interesting study may involve 
the effect of heterogeneity on the maturity of loans and the term-structure of interest 
rates. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Understanding the transmission mechanism is crucial for monetary policy. In this respect, 
the special role of banking institutions in this mechanism has been studied extensively both at 
a theoretical and empirical level. The existing evidence shows that banks alter their lending 
behavior in specific ways following a change in monetary policy. But does this reaction 
involve only changes in lending behavior, as studied in the bulk of the literature? And do all 
banks in the market respond uniformly to monetary policy changes? This paper tries to 
answer these questions by analyzing empirically the heterogeneous response of US and euro 
area banks over the period 1994-2007 in terms of their lending and risk-taking decisions 
following a monetary policy change. The ultimate impact of a monetary policy change on 
bank performance is also considered. In our empirical strategy, the distributional effects of 
monetary policy stem from a number of bank characteristics, namely liquidity, capitalization 
and market power. We contend that the results obtained can improve our understanding of a 
number of bank-based channels of monetary transmission.  
The aims of this paper are related to a long tradition in the literature of the transmission 
mechanism that accords banks a special role. In particular, Bernanke and Blinder (1988), 
among other proponents of the so-called bank lending channel, suggest that the effect of 
monetary policy on aggregate demand through interest rates may be enhanced by financial 
market imperfections and the existence of imperfect substitutability between loans and 
securities in bank portfolios and also as a means of borrowing for firms. One of the 
identification schemes for the lending channel involves estimation of reduced-form lending 
equations, where loan supply shifts are traced by using bank-level data on bank 
characteristics (see Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Ashcraft, 2006).  
 Yet, while the literature on the impact of monetary policy changes on bank lending is 
extensive, the corresponding impact on risk-taking and performance of banks is much less 
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that banks can borrow short at lower rates and use these funds to invest in longer-term 
projects at higher rates. In addition, a decrease in interest rates reduces agency costs or may 
cause banks to relax their lending standards, raising credit risk and thus non-performing loans 
(Matsuyama, 2007; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Therefore, especially as bank risk-
taking is nowadays considered the bête noire of financial stability, central banks are 
increasingly concerned with avoiding price bubbles and minimizing incentives for banks to 
take on very high risks. However, it is only very recently that empirical methods have been 
proposed to examine the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking (Jimenez et al., 2007; 
Ioannidou et al., 2008). The results suggest that in a low interest-rate environment banks 
have incentives to take on higher risks in search for yield. Still, a major concern for the 
empirical analysis is the fact that banks respond quite heterogeneously to monetary policy 
changes and this may also have implications for their risk-taking and profitability, as in the 
case of lending.
1     
      The  heterogeneous  behavior  of  banks  originates from their different balance sheet 
characteristics. Theory on the bank lending channel identifies incentive mechanisms that 
work through the capital structure of banks, their liquidity levels and/or their size and argues 
that these mechanisms may play an important role in altering bank lending when there is a 
change in policy interest rates (see e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Bolton and Freixas, 2006). 
Empirical evidence on these propositions is restricted to testing whether the interaction of 
monetary policy variables with bank liquidity and capitalization levels is an important 
determinant of loan growth (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Gambacorta, 2005), while an 
analysis of the distributional effects of monetary policy on bank risk and profitability due to 
                                                 
1 In a recent line of work, Den Haan et al. (2007) examine the impact of monetary policy on the composition of 
bank loans and find differential responses between different types of loans. Even though this type of 
heterogeneity is different from the one examined in the present study, it still provides micro-level evidence that 
the sources of heterogeneity are important and multifaceted.  
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important from a policy perspective as it improves our understanding of the way monetary 
policy may affect the real economy. 
Using a method that identifies parameter heterogeneity at the bank level, this paper aims 
to (i) add to the limited literature that considers the effect of monetary policy on bank risk-
taking and profitability and, more importantly, (ii) analyze and quantify the heterogeneous 
response of banks following a change in monetary policy. To carry out these tasks we resort 
to a local generalized method of moments (LGMM) technique. This technique, as developed 
by Lewbel (2007) and Tran and Tsionas (2008), considers the estimation of a dynamic panel 
data model, in which it allows the estimated coefficients to directly vary according to the 
smooth coefficient model (for an introduction to smoothing techniques, see Loader, 1999). 
The smooth coefficient model lets the marginal effect of the monetary policy variable to be 
an unknown function of observable bank characteristics and hence introduces heterogeneity 
directly in the marginal effect of a monetary policy change. 
 Three different equations are considered, corresponding to a loan, a credit risk and a 
profitability model. The specification of the first equation follows previous studies of the 
bank lending channel, but its estimation also allows for quantification of heterogeneity. The 
other two equations provide novel results for the extent of heterogeneity in the impact of 
monetary policy on bank risk-taking and profitability. The bank characteristics serving as the 
smoothing variables are chosen to be liquidity, capitalization and market power of banks. For 
the market power variable a number of reasons are provided below on why it is preferred to 
size, while its measurement is based on a recent technique that allows obtaining estimates at 
the bank level. The choice of the other two bank characteristics is in line with the empirical 
studies of the lending channel discussed earlier. Given the above, we can explicitly illustrate 
the plan of the present analysis in terms of a chart (Chart 1). In particular, a change in 
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manner because of differential bank characteristics such as liquidity, capitalization and 
market power. This will have important implications for the real economy. However, 
analyzing the first two steps is probably already a lengthy task and therefore we leave the 
overall impact on real output as a future endeavor. 
 
Chart 1 





The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical 
considerations about the relationships between monetary policy and (i) bank lending, (ii) 
bank risk-taking and (iii) bank profitability; it also analyzes the theory behind choosing 
liquidity, capitalization and market power as the smoothing variables. Section 3 describes the 
empirical model and the dataset and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 
5 summarizes the main conclusions and provides some directions for future research.   
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
The literature that studies bank behavior and monetary policy is multifaceted and each of 
the approaches merits a discussion in its own right. Here we focus on the theoretical 
framework that assigns banks a special role in the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
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the role that a number of bank characteristics such as liquidity, capitalization and market 
power may play in shaping a heterogeneous response of banks in their lending and risk-
taking behavior as well as their performance following a change in monetary policy. 
 
2.1. Channels of monetary policy transmission through banks 
tary policy affects bank loan 
sup
 of another channel, namely the risk-taking channel, has been 
put forward. Elements of this channel can be traced in Gibson (1997), who suggested that 
                                                
According to the traditional lending channel view, mone
ply and this in turn has an independent and significant effect on aggregate economic 
activity. In general, two conditions must be fulfilled for a bank lending channel to exist 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). On the one hand, borrowers are not able to fully insulate their 
real spending from a decline in the availability of bank loans, i.e. bank loans are imperfect 
substitutes for other sources of finance. On the other hand, banks are not able to fully insulate 
their loan supply from a monetary policy-induced change in their reserves, i.e. there are no 
perfect substitutes for loans in bank portfolios. Both conditions have been subject to 
considerable debate in the literature. For instance, Romer and Romer (1990) suggested that if 
banks are able to obtain funds by tapping financial markets, monetary policy would affect 
banks only through changes in interest rates and, therefore, no bank lending channel would 
be at work.
2 Empirically the bank lending channel has been explored by many studies with 
mixed results (for the US case, see Kashyap and Stein, 2000; for the euro area, see the 
collection of papers in Angeloni et al., 2003). There is consensus, however, that in financial 
systems that are more market-based the higher degree of asset substitutability makes the bank 
lending channel less potent.  
More recently, the notion
 
2  Unlike what is observed with the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) framework, in Romer and Romer (1990) 
bonds (securities issued outside the banking system) do not appear in banks’ balance sheets and can be perfect 
substitutes for either certificates of deposit (a bank liability) or loans (a bank asset). 
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f bank profitability to changes in 
mo
netary policy has a greater effect on banks at times when their balance sheets have a 
riskier composition of assets. Several dimensions of how the risk-taking channel can work 
have been proposed. Matsuyama (2007) suggests that expansionary monetary policy 
reinforces the incentives of intermediaries to finance riskier projects. In a similar vein, Dell’ 
Ariccia and Marquez (2006) and Rajan (2006) provide evidence that during lending booms 
loan quality deteriorates, as both lenders and borrowers are willing to take on higher risks. 
Furthermore, in addition to this effect working through the risk-taking of banks, it has been 
argued (see ECB, 2008) that the monetary policy of low interest rates followed in recent 
years, by affecting asset prices has led some institutional investors to invest increasingly in 
credit-related assets in search for higher yield. This has allowed banks to increasingly fund 
themselves by selling loans in the secondary market, thus potentially boosting the supply of 
new loans. However, this may also have contributed to a higher value of non-performing 
loans. Empirical evidence to support the above theoretical arguments is scant. Jimenez et al. 
(2007) use a sample of Spanish banks and a variety of duration models to find that lower 
short-term interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting more risky new 
loans. Ioannidou et al. (2008) examine the Bolivian case (it has a dollarized banking system) 
and find that a decrease in the US federal funds rate prior to loan origination raises the 
monthly probability of default on individual bank loans. 
The potential relationship between a change in monetary policy and the risk-taking of 
banks has interesting implications for the sensitivity o
netary conditions. A steeper term structure of interest rates as a result of looser monetary 
policy has often been associated with a situation in which banks are more profitable, as they 
can borrow short at rates that are lower than those at which they can lend long. Moreover, 
policy changes have implications for the profitability of lending activities because, as 
discussed above, they can alter the risk-taking of banks and the risk perception of borrowers 
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that explicitly focuses on the relationship between nominal interest rates and bank 
profitability, several studies use interest rates as control variables in profitability equations 
with mixed results (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
3  
At this point we should probably note that the above discussion of the monetary policy 
transmission through bank lending, risk-taking and profitability does not address the issue of 
pos
Recent empirical studies of the bank lending channel test for distributional effects of 
ng for the bank characteristics of liquidity, 
cap
                                                
sible heterogeneity in the response of banks following a change in monetary policy. This 
heterogeneity, which arises from differential bank balance sheet characteristics, such as 
liquidity, capitalization and size, has been examined by a number of theoretical and empirical 
studies mainly in the framework of the bank lending channel. Below we shall examine the 
implications of bank heterogeneity for the response of banks in terms of lending, risk-taking 
and ultimately profitability to monetary policy impulses.  
 
2.2. Distributional effects of monetary policy 
monetary  policy among banks by controlli
italization and size (see e.g. Gambacorta, 2005; papers in Angeloni et al., 2003). The 
main contribution of this literature is the use of bank characteristics and hence of panel data 
to solve the identification problem of the lending channel, i.e. distinguishing between shifts 
in loan demand and shifts in loan supply.
4 Yet, the heterogeneous impact of a change in 
monetary policy on bank risk-taking and profitability has not been examined so far. In 
 
3 In fact, there is an extensive literature on the determinants of bank risk-taking that includes control variables   
for the monetary conditions (see e.g. Jimenez et al., 2006 and references therein). However, the focus of these 
and is independent of these characteristics. 
studies is not shifts in monetary policy and the general practice is to employ only the level (not the change) of 
various interest-rate variables. The same applies to studies that examine empirical models of bank performance 
(for a recent review of this literature, see Athanasoglou et al., 2008). An interesting study is that of Albetrazzi 
and Gambacorta (2006), suggesting that an increase in the money market rate has no separate effect on net 
interest income, but reduces significantly the return on assets, which is a measure that includes non-interest 
income. 
4 This strategy relies on the hypothesis that bank characteristics influence only loan supply movements while 
loan dem
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not been systematically analyzed.  
In the present study we depart from using size as the third bank balance sheet 
characteristic influencing banks’ reaction to changes in policy rates. The main argument for 
the
behavior is stronger for banks with 
less
 use of bank size is that one would expect the largest banks to have an easier time raising 
uninsured finance, which would make their lending less dependent on monetary policy 
shocks irrespective of other bank characteristics (Kashyap and Stein, 1997; 2000). However, 
this implicitly suggests that certain banks have market power in raising uninsured finance, 
something that may or may not be the result of size. This feature naturally is carried over to 
the asset side of bank balance sheets causing deviations from perfectly competitive behavior. 
It is also noteworthy that Lensink and Sterken (2002), in editing a special issue of the Journal 
of Banking and Finance, suggested that future work should identify whether bank 
competition plays an important role in the monetary transmission mechanism. Therefore, in 
this paper we use the market power of banks alongside with liquidity and capitalization as a 
critical element in the pass-through of monetary policy.  
In the context of the bank lending channel, Kashyap and Stein (2000), among others, 
suggest that the impact of monetary policy on lending 
 liquid balance sheets. In a recent theoretical study, Diamond and Rajan (2006) suggest a 
different means through which the lending channel may be at work. In particular, they 
suggest that an expansionary open market operation increases financial liquidity, which 
alleviates the real liquidity pressures on banks, which then allows them to fund longer-term 
projects and therefore enhance aggregate economic activity. This implies that the effect of 
monetary policy is further amplified when banks hold a higher value of liquid assets 
(especially in a low interest rate environment) because banks will use the extra liquidity in 
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these banks to increase above average.  
Turning to the effect that liquidity may have on the relationship between policy rates and 
bank risk-taking, we would expect banks with higher levels of liquid assets, which reflect 
hig
e on bank lending, risk-
king and profitability will decrease (increase) with higher (lower) levels of bank liquidity.  
 
at following a contraction in the money growth rate, poorly capitalized banks reduce their 
len
her risk aversion, to have lower incentives to take on more credit risk after an 
expansionary monetary policy. To the extent that this holds, the impact of monetary policy 
on bank risk is weakened.  Also, if banks with relatively illiquid portfolios face higher risks, 
due for example to a prolonged period of low interest rates,  then these banks may be less 
able to use part of their liquidity in less risky activities, and reduce credit risk thereon.   
However, it may also be the case that excess liquidity of banks in a low interest rate 
environment provides incentives for higher risk-taking if banks feel particularly safe (a moral 
hazard problem). This situation, although not representing typical bank behavior, can lead to 
a deterioration of bank asset quality and a sharp increase in bank risk. On the basis of the 
above arguments, we may formulate our first hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: We expect that the impact of a monetary policy chang
ta
 
In the context of the credit channel, Peek and Rosegren (1995), among others, suggest
th
ding much more than better capitalized banks, since they usually have less access to 
markets for uninsured funding. Bolton and Freixas (2006) on the other hand, emphasize the 
imperfect substitutability of equity capital with other sources of funds for banks and highlight 
that there is a secondary bank lending channel operating through the bank equity-capital 
market, even when banks have perfect access to non-deposit liabilities or to the bond market. 
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base. If capital regulations are in place, banks are likely to react by decreasing the supply of 
loans, thus magnifying the contractionary effect of monetary policy.  
This is also related to the theory of credit rationing (that  originates in Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981), which suggests that the underlying factor of a credit crunch may be a change in the 
risk
 2: We expect that the impact of a monetary policy change on bank lending, risk-
king and profitability will decrease (increase) with higher (lower) levels of bank equity 
g argued that liquidity and capitalization of banks potentially play an important role 
as regards the extent to which bank balance sheets are sensitive to monetary policy changes, 
we 
 perception of banks, which in turn could be triggered by a change in monetary policy, a 
shortage of bank capital or both. In these situations ─ besides the direct impact of monetary 
policy on bank lending ─ bank risk-taking and ultimately profitability (through the channels 
discussed in Section 2.1) are also likely to be heterogeneously affected on the basis of 
differential levels of equity capital. Especially for risk, more capitalized banks are probably 
more able to buffer excess loan losses following an expansionary monetary policy, and 








turn now to the possible effect of bank market power. Baglioni (2007) investigated a 
model of the banking industry under both monopolistic competition and a Cournot oligopoly  
and suggested that under the former the effect of monetary policy is amplified, while under 
the latter it is weakened. Note that empirical evidence from the European banking industry 
suggests that most banking systems in euro area countries are characterized by monopolistic 
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systems of newly acceded EU countries feature oligopolistic behavior (see Brissimis et al., 
2008).  
 If, following an expansionary monetary policy, banks on average take on higher credit 
risk in search for yield, then banks with high market power will probably not engage in such 
acti
tary policy change on bank lending, risk-
king and profitability will decrease (increase) with higher (lower) levels of bank market 
ain insights into these issues, we build on recent econometric techniques so as to 
ncover patterns of heterogeneity based on individual bank behavior, thus greatly improving 
our
.1. The empirical model 
 of the econometric model. We 
sk and profitability equations with a view to identifying the degree 
                                                
vities because they already extract rents from the fact that they have market power. 
However, banks with market power may also see their revenue rise from other activities 
besides lending (which corresponds to credit risk) and therefore their profits may rise above 
average following a fall in policy interest rates.
5 On the basis of the above, our third testable 
hypothesis is formulated along the following lines: 
 






 understanding of the transmission mechanism through banks. Bearing these issues in 
mind, we now proceed to the discussion of the empirical framework. 
 
3. Methodology for estimating the effects of heterogeneity 
3
The starting point in the estimation procedure is the setup
opt to estimate lending, ri
 
5 An example of this is higher than average increases in revenue from capital markets or off-balance sheet 
activities. 
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e the same incentives, technology and balance sheet 
cha
s. First, and related to the above, disaggregating the impact of monetary 
pol
                                                
eterogeneity in banks’ response following a monetary policy change. For this purpose we 
employ a smoothing technique, and in particular the Local GMM (LGMM) method proposed 
by Tran and Tsionas (2008).
6  
The main advantage of this approach is that like all smoothing techniques it relaxes the 
assumption that banks shar
racteristics, and therefore that they have the same response to a shift in monetary policy. 
This is accomplished because the parameters of the estimated equations are made 
observation-specific through localization. LGMM allows the marginal effect of the monetary 
policy variable to be a function of observable covariates (in particular liquidity, 
capitalization, and market power) and hence it introduces heterogeneity directly into the 
marginal effect.
7 By examining the coefficients obtained one can in fact estimate the extent 
of heterogeneity using simple statistical measures, like the standard deviation or the variance 
of the coefficients.  
In addition, this strategy presents at least three other advantages, compared to 
conventional method
icy at the bank level allows for the inclusion of different types of banks, and also of banks 
across different banking sectors in the sample (no uniform production technology is 
assumed). This advantage is remarkable because the researcher and the policy-maker can 
gain a more thorough insight into the international banking sector through a single estimation 
model. Second, LGMM allows for non-parametric heteroskedasticity in the error term, which 
is important because parameter estimates in panel data models depend critically on the nature 
of heteroskedasticity. By accommodating heteroskedasticity of an unknown form, the quite 
restrictive normality assumption is effectively removed and statistical efficiency is improved. 
Third, this technique (unlike other smoothing techniques) embeds all the properties of the 
 
6 In fact, LGMM has been first proposed, but not implemented, by Lewbel (2007). 
7 This also completely solves the problem of multicollinearity that is present when using interaction terms in 
parametric models. 
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dependent variable within a panel data context; and it is well-known that bank variables like 
lending, risk-taking and profitability persist to a large extent (Berger et al., 2000).
8   
The equations to be estimated are directly obtained from the literature. The first equation 
considers the response of lending to monetary policy and follows from the bank lending 
cha
it it i t it t it − 2 )  
        ( 3 )  
where ∆ denotes change, l is lending of bank i in period t (in logarithmic terms), r is a 
measure of bank risk, Π is a measure of b
rametric techniques have to be applied to larger datasets to 
                                                
nnel literature (see e.g. Kashyap and Stein, 2000). The second considers the impact of 
monetary policy on bank risk-taking and follows from the literature that explains credit risk, 
which however does not emphasize the effect of monetary policy (see e.g. Boyd et al., 2006). 
Finally, the third equation considers a simple profitability/performance equation (see e.g. 
Brissimis et al., 2008). Thus, the estimated equations are of the following form: 
1
1, 1 2 ( ) ()( ) () it it i t it t it la zl a z M u - = + +         ( 1 )  
2 () () ( ) () rb zr b z M u ∆= ∆ + ∆ +         ( 1, 1 2
3
1, 1 2 () ( ) ( ) ( ) it it i t it t it cz cz M u - = + +
ank profitability, z are the bank characteristics of 
liquidity, capitalization and market power (used alternatively), M is the monetary policy 
variable and u is the error term. Hence, the empirical model suggests that in all three 
equations the dynamic adjustment coefficient and the coefficient on the monetary policy 
variable may vary directly with the bank’s liquidity, capitalization, and market power. In 
other words, the empirical framework follows closely the theoretical considerations provided 
in Section 2. 
At this point, a number of critical remarks can be made on the estimation procedure. 
First, it is well-known that non-pa
 
8 For more on these issues and on the derivation of the asymptotic properties of the LGMM estimator, see Tran 
and Tsionas (2008). 
 
  ECB
Working Paper Series No 1233
August 2010 19
∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆ Π Πavo
nd the euro area (the first 12 EU countries 
uro area) banking sectors are used for the empirical analysis. Bank-
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id the so-called “curse of dimensionality”. Fortunately, this is not an issue for micro-level 
studies like the present one, where datasets are quite large. Second, the literature on the non-
parametric methods has not yet reached consensus on the selection of an optimal bandwidth.
9 
Recent studies on local techniques (see e.g. Kumbhakar et al., 2007; Park et al., 2007) rely on 
cross-validation, which involves estimating the average squared prediction or estimation 
error. Yet, cross-validation methods have been criticized as giving results that are too 
variable and unreliable (see e.g. Ruppert et al., 1995), and this literature mainly proposes 
simple plug-in methods. Since cross-validation is a more formal method, it is the main 
approach followed here. However, robustness of the results is ensured by examining the 
consequences of small changes in the bandwidth.  
 
3.2. Data and variables 
 Large panel datasets for the United States a
that participated in the e
el data is obtained from the Bankscope database and covers the 1994-2007 period. The 
final unbalanced datasets are built by applying two selection criteria. First, all types of banks 
that take deposits (commercial, savings, cooperative and bank holding companies) are 
included in the sample. Investment banks are not included because they do not take deposits 
and therefore do not fall into the theoretical discussion provided above. Second, an outlier 
rule is applied to the main bank-level variables so as to disregard the 2% of both edges of 
their distribution. This also deletes all banks for which data on the main variables of this 
study is not available. The final sample consists of 5873 observations for the United States 
and 6133 observations for the euro area banking sector, therefore 12006 observations in 
 
9 A large bandwidth leads to an oversmoothed curve that may inadequately model or completely miss important 
features of parameter heterogeneity, while a small bandwidth may undersmooth the curve resulting in a very 
noisy fit. 
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10 The relatively large time dimension (14 years) and the cross-sectional dimension of 
the country-specific variables allows for considerable variability in the monetary policy 
variable. 
Note here that Bankscope data is annual and an immediate question arises as to why 
ann
tics for all the variables of the study that are analyzed 
belo
                                                
ual data is used to study monetary policy. Most work on the lending channel (see e.g. 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000) employed quarterly data to study the lending behavior of banks. 
This is less frequent concerning the risk and profitability equations, for which most of 
existing literature employs the Bankscope database. In two recent papers, Gambacorta (2005) 
and Ashcraft (2006) point out that results obtained from lending equations are robust to the 
use of annual data. In addition, the latter study provides a thorough discussion of the reasons 
why this holds and therefore it enhances our confidence that a comparison between the US 
and the euro area on the basis of annual data is worthwhile (in general quarterly bank data on 
euro area countries are unavailable).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statis
w. l is measured by total customer loans in real terms and r by the ratio of problem loans 
to total loans. Let us briefly comment here on our choice for the risk variable. r represents 
credit risk, i.e. the potential variation in net income and the market value of equity resulting 
from a non-payment or delayed payment by borrowers. Whenever a bank grants a loan, it 
assumes the risk that the borrower will default, that is, he will not repay the principal and 
interest on a timely basis and thus our measure reflects the quality of bank loans. Since a 
portion of non-performing loans will probably result in losses for the bank, a high value for 
this ratio is unwanted. Credit risk represents the major cause of most bank failures and is 
 
10 Note again that the LGMM method allows for the inclusion of banks from different countries in a single 
estimation since it makes no parametric assumptions on the functional form or the error term. 
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lending. Thus, it is the one favored in the present analysis.
11  
Finally, bank performance Π is measured by the ratio of net profits to total assets (i.e. the 
return on assets, ROA) so as to capture the income generated from both traditional and non-
traditional banking activities. We also employed the net interest margin (i.e. the ratio of net 
interest income to total assets) and we found qualitatively similar results. The results based 
on ROA are reported because many banks engage in off-balance sheet activities, which 
generate non-interest income.
12 The descriptive statistics on the dependent variables show 
that the average euro area bank is somewhat larger in terms of loans (this is expected given 
the big number of small local US banks), with the average values for r and Π being very 
close between the two samples.  
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Ashcraft (2006), we utilize the federal funds 
rate as a measure of monetary policy in the US. For the euro area, we utilize the ECB policy 
rate from 1999 onwards (2001 for Greece) and before 1999 the official refinancing operation 
rate for each country separately. Data on these variables show that the average rate has been 
lower in the euro area; however, the range of their values is approximately equal. In all three 
equations, we control for the economic conditions by real GDP growth (denoted by GDP) 
and for financial depth by the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (CAP). The last 
measure is obtained from the Beck et al. (2000) database and the very few missing 
observations at the end of the sample are constructed by own calculations.
13 Given the virtues 
                                                 
11 Additionally we have proxied risk by the Z-index, which represents a more universal measure of bank risk, 
the ratio of provisions for loan losses to total loans, and the ratio of reserves for loan losses to total loans. All 
ratios are highly correlated and the estimation results were found to be similar. 
12 In terms of relative importance, interest revenue remains the main component of total bank income. However, 
its importance has gradually declined over the past two decades as banks sought to diversify their business away 
from the traditional banking activities. This is the main reason behind our inclination toward ROA, a measure 
that encompasses both traditional and non-traditional banking activities. Also note that some recent studies 
estimate bank performance using frontier methods. The aim of this study is to keep this part of the analysis as 
simple as possible and therefore only accounting ratios are employed. 
13 We have not been able to compute stock market capitalization for Ireland for the years 1994-1995 because the 
required data is not available.  
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between banks, we do not need to control for other bank characteristics. The descriptive 
statistics reflect the fact that the US economy has been growing faster during the sample 
period and that stock market capitalization is double that of euro area countries (even though 
some euro area countries record very high values for this index).  
Turning to the smoothing variables z, we use the  ratio of equity to total assets to measure 
the capitalization of banks and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets to measure their 
liquidity level (see also Gambacorta, 2005; studies in Angeloni et al., 2003). The values of 
the descriptive statistics for these variables are very close between the two samples. As 
regards the market power variable, making a good choice is a more complicated issue. The 
literature suggests using either structural measures of competition (i.e. concentration ratios or 
the Herfindahl index), which however present well-known limitations in measuring 
competitive conditions (see Northcott, 2004 and references therein), or non-structural 
measures (i.e. the Lerner index or the H-statistic of Panzar and Rosse, 1987).  
The non-structural measures reflect the competitive conditions at the industry level, but 
disaggregating at the bank level is difficult because one has to assume a common production 
technology for all banks (and across US states or euro area countries in the present study). 
Recently, Brissimis and Delis (2008) proposed estimating the H-statistic at the bank-level 
using a simple local regression. Once again, the idea is that local regression allows for 
observation-specific H-statistics through localization, and in doing so it also relaxes a 
number of restrictive assumptions regarding the properties of the production function of 
banks (like in the LGMM case, technology is allowed to differ at a bank-level and in time). 
Note that the H-statistic does not necessitate defining the location of the market a priori, 
which implies that the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market boundaries is 
avoided; hence for a bank that operates in more than one markets, the H-statistic will reflect 
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the core model involves only firm-level data, no specific market definition appears in the 
revenue equation. This is a huge advantage in a sample that contains countries spanning less 
than a market (euro area countries) up to thousands of local markets (as in the US).” 
Similarly, inclusion of different types of banks is not an issue (see Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Shaffer, 2004). Finally, note that estimation at the bank level of an alternative to the H-
statistic, namely the Lerner index, involves the quite restrictive assumption of imposing a 
constant marginal cost across banks. This is the main reason why we prefer the H-statistic to 
the Lerner index in the present analysis.
14  
The empirical Panzar-Rosse model involves estimation of the following revenue equation 
011 , 2 2 , 3 3 , 4 ln ln ln ln ln it it it it it it tr d d w d w d w d k e =+ + + + +      ( 4 )  
where  ,  and  are the input prices of deposits, labor and fixed capital respectively, k is 
a vector of control variables and the H-statistic is H = d
1 w 2 w 3 w
1 + d2 + d3. In this framework, the H-
statistic takes values between -1 and 1; the more negative or close to 0 the H-statistic is, the 
larger is market power, while the closer the H-statistic is to unity, the more competitive is the 
bank (see e.g. Barajas et al., 2000). Values between 0 and 1 reflect monopolistically 
competitive practices and such values correspond to most of the findings of the existing 
literature on the measurement of bank competition at the industry level (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). In Eq. (4) tr is the ratio of gross interest revenue to total assets, w1 is the ratio 
of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding, w2 is the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets, w3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total 
                                                 
14 Note, however, that the Lerner index maps more robustly into a range of oligopoly solutions than the H-
statistic, thus one may think that there is a tradeoff between using any of the two methods.  
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assets) and the logarithm of real total assets (proxy for bank size).
15   
Estimation of Eq. (4) is carried out both separately for the US and the euro area and for 
the combined sample, and the average results are surprisingly close (within the 3% range). 
This verifies Shaffer’s (2004) comments regarding the power of the H-statistic to 
accommodate location effects and the suitability of the local regression method.  The 
bandwidth required for the local regression method has been calculated by simple cross 
validation and was found to be equal to 0.673 and 0.707 for the US and euro area samples, 
respectively, and 0.680 for the combined sample; also, the type of the kernel is the 
Epanechnikov kernel (for more on these issues see Loader, 1999).
16 Since no significant 
difference was found in the results, the estimates of market power used in the subsequent 
analysis are the ones obtained from the combined sample. Table 1 provides some descriptive 
statistics for the results and Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of estimated H-
statistics. The results reveal that banks in the US behave a little more competitively on 
average and that the equations for euro area banks have a wider distribution of coefficients. 
Even though differences are not that large, this finding probably shows that certain euro area 
                                                 
15 A number of issues come up in estimating the Panzar-Rosse model. First, due to lack of data on total 
employees for many observations (especially for the early period of our sample), we do not express the unit cost 
of labor in terms of total employees but in terms of total assets (see Claessens and Laeven, 2004, among others). 
Second, since the H-statistic will be used to smooth the monetary policy variable, we do not include as control 
variables the liquidity and capitalization ratios, while we verified that these variables exhibit low correlation 
with the ratio of loans to assets (that is actually employed). Third, a number of alternative specifications were 
formed on the basis of including additional control variables (i.e. the cost to income ratio as a proxy for bank 
efficiency, the ratio of interbank deposits to total customer and short-term funding as a proxy for differences in 
the deposit mix and/or the ratio of cash and due from depository institutions to total deposits as a proxy for 
correspondent bank activities). Changes in the results were not significant and hence the study proceeded with 
the simple formulation described in the main text. Finally, the PR model should be estimated on observations 
that are in long-run equilibrium. The empirical test for equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive 
capital markets will equalize the risk-adjusted rate of return across banks, so that (in equilibrium) the rate of 
return should not be statistically correlated with input prices. To test for equilibrium, one can calculate another 
H-statistic (Hn) using the rate of return (return on assets), instead of total revenue, as the dependent variable in 
the regression equation. In this framework, Hn=0 indicates that banking systems are in equilibrium. Following 
exactly the same procedure (in terms of variables and estimation method) with Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
among others, we find that both the Unites States and the euro area are “in equilibrium”. These results are not 
reported but are available on request.    
16 Specifying a different type of kernel produces negligible differences in the results. 
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M&A activity in the euro area has taken place mainly within each country and not so much 
across borders. It is interesting to note that some euro area banks are characterized by 
monopolistic behavior with values of coefficients close to 0 or negative, while such 
coefficients are very rarely found for the US banking sector. Bikker and Haaf (2002) and 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) find such differences between euro area banking sectors when 
estimating the Panzar-Rosse model at the country level, and this enhances confidence in the 
results of this paper. Hence, and in line with the theoretical arguments provided in Section 2, 
these bank-level market power estimates are used as the third smoothing variable z in the 
main empirical analysis that follows.    
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Practical issues in the estimation procedure and general results 
The precision of the LGMM estimator depends on the choice of the instruments. We 
follow Newey (1990) and Tran and Tsionas (2008) in using the kernel estimates of 
 as instruments for , while M is instrumented on its 
first two lags. The same rule applies for the risk and profitability equations. Again the 
Epanechnikov kernel is used and the optimal bandwidth was estimated by univariate cross 
validation and found to be 0.585 for the lending equation, 0.604 for the credit risk equation 
and 0.621 for the profitability equation. All models include time effects. Finally, it was 
verified that the results are robust to both the choice of the bandwidth
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 { ( )| ), ( | )} it it it it El z El z −− − − ∆∆ ,1 it l − ∆
17 and to adding a third 
lag in the instruments (however in this case precision deteriorated as the mean square error of 
the regressions increased). 
                                                 
17 Numerous values for the bandwidth have been examined in the ± 20% area of the optimal bandwidth. Indeed, 
when there is large differentiation from the optimal bandwidth, the resulting distributions reveal oversmoothing 
or undersmoothing. Hence, we feel that at least in the present panel, cross validation is suitable. 
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which can be constructed using bootstrapping. In our analysis we use nonparametric 
bootstrap percentile confidence intervals to infer the significance level of the effects. The 
intervals are estimated at the 95% level using the mean value of our sample (we also used the 
median with similar results) and the asymptotic normal approximation. We performed 1000 
bootstrap replications. If the confidence interval fails to include 0 in the estimations provided 
below, then for the average estimate the p-value is less than or equal to 0.05 and the effect is 
statistically significant. Note, however, that in the present study we focus on the 
heterogeneity of the coefficients and not so much on the average effects. Therefore, if bank 
behavior is far from the average and distributions of coefficients do not approximate the 
normal distribution, then more than one peak effect may be present in the same relationship. 
We will elaborate on this point below.  
The results on the observation-specific coefficient estimates for the monetary policy 
variable obtained by LGMM are presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4. In the notes to these figures 
we report our estimates for the confidence intervals. Only the impact of the monetary policy 
variable when smoothed by liquidity, capitalization or market power is reported, but the 
relevant figures illustrating the distribution of the coefficients for the control variables are 
available and can be provided upon request. In the figures, bars symbolize the frequency of 
the coefficient estimates and two lines are added, one representing the actual distribution and 
one the normal distribution. Increasing values of coefficients as we move to the right along 
the horizontal axis in graphs b, c and d of Figures 2, 3 and 4 are associated with higher values 
of liquidity, capitalization and market power, respectively. Average values for the mean and 
the standard deviation of the coefficients for the United States, the euro area and the full 
sample are provided in Table 2, which also reports the estimated confidence intervals. In 
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combined sample is given in Table 3.  
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable when capitalization is used as the 
smoothing variable are also reported in the first graph of each figure to reflect the extent of 
the dynamic nature of the panel. Note that a value of these coefficients between 0 and 1 
implies that there is persistence in the dependent variables, but their values will eventually 
return to their normal (average) level. A value close to 0 means that the dependent variable is 
characterized by high speed of adjustment, and a value close to 1 implies very slow 
adjustment (see Nerlove, 2002). In general, all models indicate significant persistence (i.e. 
the confidence intervals do not include 0). The coefficients of the lagged variable in the 
lending equation display a bimodal distribution, with the mode on the left being the dominant 
one. This distribution of the coefficients is very wide reflecting significant differentiation 
(heterogeneity) in the level of persistence among banks, a result consistent with variations in 
the degree of relationship-lending (see Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Interestingly, the 
distribution of the lagged dependent variable in the credit risk and profitability equations 
approximates the normal distribution quite well; however, in the credit risk equation 
heterogeneity seems high as the coefficients take values from a low close to 0 (no 
persistence) to a high of 0.8-1 (very high persistence). The coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable when smoothed by liquidity and market power look very similar and are 
not presented here. 
The findings reported in Table 2 confirm that a bank lending channel is less operative in 
the United States than in the euro area (smaller average coefficient on the monetary policy 
variable), a result that backs up the argument suggesting that increased market-based finance 
(such as of the Anglo-Saxon type) reduces the potency of the bank lending channel. 
However, in both the United States and the euro area the impact of the interest rate variable is 
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over time regardless of the choice of the smoothing variable (-0.407 in 1994 and -0.262 in 
2007 when z is capitalization). It is expected that, ceteris paribus, the continuous move 
toward Anglo-Saxon type of financial systems will further decrease this impact in the long 
term. Differences in the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking behavior and the 
profitability of banks are not particularly large between the two sub-samples, although the 
standard deviation of the distributions presents some differences. The latter result is 
especially true when market power is used as the smoothing variable, indicating considerable 
behavioral differences between some of the more segmented euro area banking sectors and 
the relatively more competitive US market.  
Table 3 presents the course over time of the standard deviation of the coefficients 
obtained from the nine estimated equations. The information that can be extracted from these 
figures is that there is an apparent increase in the standard deviation (or equally in the 
variance) of the coefficients during episodes of distress (see figures for 2001 or figures for 
2007), while low values occur during episodes of relative stability. This is quite expected as, 
in general, distress causes different behaviors and stability enhances uniformity.            
 
4.2. Monetary policy and lending 
The average values reported for the coefficients of the interest rate variable in the lending 
equations are negative and statistically significant, regardless of which smoothing variable is 
used. Yet, the standard deviation of estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 and the distributions 
of estimates presented in Figure 2 reflect the wide heterogeneity in the bank-level 
coefficients. For example, Figure 2c shows that when M is smoothed by the capitalization of 
banks, the impact of monetary policy on loan growth ranges substantially and that the 
distribution of this coefficient is trimodal (with modes at about -0.5, -0.3 and -0.15). This 
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their capital structures, with more capitalized banks (i.e. those on the right end of the 
distribution) responding less to monetary policy changes. This is also reflected in the high 
variance of the coefficients (see Tables 2 and 3), while this variance tends to be higher during 
episodes of financial turmoil or increasing economic fluctuations (see values for 2001 and 
2007 in Table 3). Overall, these findings suggest that hypothesis 2 above is confirmed as 
regards the effect of monetary policy on bank lending. 
The same and even more pronounced in terms of variance are the results obtained when 
M is smoothed by the market power variable. The coefficients for banks with relatively high 
market power are found on the right end of the distribution shown in Figure 2d, and these 
coefficients are less significant or not significant at all if they fall outside the relevant 
confidence interval. Therefore, market power of banks and competitive conditions in general 
prove to be a significant element through which monetary policy affects lending. In 
particular, as in the case of capitalization, high market power tends to buffer the impact of a 
shift in policy rates. Thus, the third hypothesis as regards the impact of monetary policy on 
bank lending is also confirmed. This is a novel result altogether because previous studies 
considered measures of size or industry-level measures of competition, not bank-level market 
power.  
An approximately normal distribution is illustrated in the figure concerning liquidity 
(Figure 2b), which implies that a parametric model may capture quite well the “global form” 
of the transmission through liquidity. Still, the large variance of the coefficients suggests that 
the impact of monetary policy is not uniform and can be important for certain banks (e.g. 
those identified with coefficients close to -0.5) and of less importance for other (those 
identified with coefficients on the right end of the distribution). The fact that different levels 
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in monetary policy suggests that the relevant part of hypothesis 1 is also confirmed. 
 
4.3. Monetary policy and risk 
The results for the risk equations indicate that credit risk is highly persistent and that the 
monetary policy variable has on average a negative but marginally significant coefficient. 
(confidence intervals overlap with 0 when M is smoothed by liquidity and capitalization).
18 
Without placing particular emphasis on monetary policy variables (they use them as 
controls), recent studies on credit risk provide mixed results for the relationship between 
interest rates and credit risk (see e.g. Chen, 2007; Salas and Saurina, 2003). This is expected, 
since theory suggests that on the one hand low interest rates indeed tend to create excessive 
risk-taking, but on the other they also reduce the risk of outstanding bank credit. In the only 
detailed studies of the risk-interest rate nexus, Ioannidou et al. (2008) find that low interest 
rates are associated with higher risk and tend to reduce the loan rates of risky vis-à-vis 
riskless borrowers. Jimenez et al. (2007) suggest that low interest rates reduce credit risk in 
the very short run but worsen it in the long run. Therefore, even though the present study 
does not use such detailed data, the general results are in line with those of this very recent 
literature.  
Note, however, that the findings presented in Figure 3 show that the average negative and 
marginally significant relationship between ∆M and ∆r in Eq. (2) is not the same for all 
banks, with the distributions of the estimated coefficients being bimodal for all three 
specifications. Banks with higher liquidity and capitalization are on the right end of the 
distributions shown in Figures 3b and 3c. For these banks the impact of a monetary policy 
change on credit risk is close to 0, which implies that the relevant parts of hypotheses 1 and 2 
                                                 
18 M is significant if 90% confidence intervals are constructed (i.e. M is significant at the 10 % level). 
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risk following an increase in policy rates (i.e. many coefficients are positive). This implies 
that higher liquidity and, primarily, capitalization induce some banks (those on the right end 
of the distributions in Figures 3b and 3c) in light of e.g. a contractionary monetary policy to 
continue promoting risk-taking activities despite the fact that funding becomes more 
expensive. Nevertheless, such behavior could eventually lead to the erosion of the liquidity 
and/or capital base of these banks and in turn to deterioration in the health of their balance 
sheets in the face of a credit crunch.  
Even when market power is used as the smoothing variable (Figure 3d), a large number 
of banks identified with comparatively high market power do not change their attitude 
toward credit risk (see the highest peak of the distribution where coefficients are very close 
to 0) and a smaller number of banks with less market power clearly follow risk-averse 
strategies (see the second peak on the left of the distribution). To expand on the above 
findings, a moral hazard mechanism may be in place (if one assumes that banks identified 
with positive coefficients embrace risky borrowers that are rejected from other risk-averse 
lenders), in order to promote the self-interest of managers or to gain a greater market share. 
Finally, the fact that in all three graphs the distributions are bimodal with a peak in the 
neighborhood of zero (indicating no or small response) and a peak in the region of negative 
values, definitely implies that the patterns studied are complicated, the effects are highly 
heterogeneous and inference cannot be made adequately on the basis of normal, symmetric or 
unimodal distributions that are associated with parametric models.   
 
4.4. Monetary policy and profitability 
The estimates of the profitability equations indicate that bank profits persist but they will 
eventually return to their normal (average) level because, as in the previous two models of 
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average coefficient on the monetary policy variable is not statistically significant and takes a 
value very close to 0 in all three specifications (see Figures 4b, c and d). Thus, a parametric 
model would suggest that there is no impact of monetary policy on bank profits. 
Yet, heterogeneity of the coefficients in the profitability equations is quite large, 
especially when the monetary policy variable is smoothed by capitalization and market 
power. In particular, note that, when M is smoothed by capitalization, the relative coefficients 
have a mean value of -0.051 (see Table 2). The distribution of the coefficients (see Figure 4c) 
is trimodal and the highest peak is on the left side (at around -0.21). This implies that for a 
large number of less capitalized banks (the ones found on the left of the distribution) the 
impact of monetary policy on bank profits is negative and statistically significant. However, 
this is not the end of the story illustrated in Figure 4c. While the presence of a second highest 
peak implies that a considerable number of banks do not respond to a monetary policy 
change (because coefficients around this peak take values close to zero), there is also a third 
mode on the right end of the distribution showing that for a substantial number of the banks 
in the sample that are well-capitalized, profitability and monetary policy changes are 
positively related. Therefore, the part of hypothesis 2 (and the associated literature) that 
relates to bank profitability does not fully describe the relationship in hand, as it does not 
predict the positive relationship identified for many banks in our sample. Differently phrased, 
it seems that banks with higher (lower) levels of equity capital benefit (lose) from a 
contractionary monetary policy. In contrast, the implications of hypothesis 1 seem to hold as 
the impact of M on profitability for the banks with higher levels of liquidity is very close to 
0. 
In the profitability equations, a considerable difference is found between US and euro 
area banks in that most of the latter are the ones identified with a non-existent (or even a 
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considered for this pattern. First, in the euro area the negative relationship may be masked by 
the considerable changes that occurred in the member countries during the sample period and 
the comparatively small volatility in interest rates relative to these changes. Second, the 
maturity structure of bank balance sheets in the euro area is quite different from that in the 
United States and more detailed data may be needed to generate a significant relationship. 
Similar effects are found when the monetary policy variable is smoothed by liquidity and 
most importantly by market power. Indeed banks with higher market power tend to earn 
higher profits when interest rates rise, while heterogeneity as measured by the variance of the 
distribution is again considerable (see Figure 4d and relevant columns in Tables 2 and 3).      
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
It is old news to say that bank behavior nurtured the severe financial distress of 2008, 
which has unfolded to a recession. The present study seeks to identify whether data from the 
last 14 years assign a special role to monetary policy in shaping bank profitability, lending 
and risk-taking. We find that bank-level responses to policy rate changes are often far from 
the average, normal response identified by the parametric estimates. The validity of this 
argument is uncovered in the present study with the help of a local generalized method of 
moments technique, which provides observation-specific estimates of the impact of monetary 
policy on bank balance sheets. Therefore, heterogeneous bank behavior is identified at the 
bank level and is actually measured by the variance of the distribution of estimated 
coefficients.  
As banks have a special role in the financing of economic activity (see e.g. Ashcraft, 
2005) their heterogeneous behavior is of particular importance to researchers and policy-
makers alike. The present analysis showed that banks with healthier balance sheets and 
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some cases they seem to take advantage of the market. However, when it comes to risk-
taking and profitability it is well-known that during sudden episodes of financial turmoil 
(such as the present one) the balance sheet strength of even the healthiest banks quickly 
deteriorates and those banks exposed to high risks may become insolvent.  
The analysis of this paper has already covered a lot of ground and therefore we have 
chosen to leave some interesting extensions for future research. An obvious immediate 
extension is to use measures of heterogeneity to assess the effect of monetary policy on real 
output in empirical models similar to the ones proposed by Driscoll (2004) or Ashcraft 
(2006). If, in addition, more disaggregate bank-level data on loans is available, an interesting 
study may involve the effect of heterogeneity on the maturity of loans and the term-structure 
of interest rates. Other issues concerning differential responses of banks to regulation, with 
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Table 2 





















Euro area  -0.343  -0.295  -0.384  -0.030 -0.019 -0.051 -0.052  0.006  -0.004 
  0.408 0.099 1.114 0.066 0.039 0.601 0.273 0.314 0.912 
United States  -0.215  -0.307  -0.317  -0.049 -0.029 -0.048 -0.050 -0.031 -0.012 
  0.367 0.076 0.882 0.053 0.019 0.510 0.264 0.287 0.797 
Full sample  -0.307  -0.303  -0.353  -0.038 -0.023 -0.050 -0.051 -0.012 -0.007 




















Notes: The table presents the mean and standard deviation (in the first and the second row for each region and the full 
sample) of the estimated coefficients for the lending, risk and profitability equations. It also presents the values for the 
constructed confidence intervals (conf. intervals) for the full sample. In each equation capitalization (capit.), liquidity (liq.) 

























1994  0.342  0.083  0.637 0.073  0.036  0.621 0.222  0.342 0.805 
1995  0.421  0.085  0.604 0.062  0.035  0.618 0.235  0.364 0.878 
1996  0.412  0.091  0.682 0.061  0.032  0.616 0.223  0.301 0.840 
1997  0.373  0.089  0.741 0.053  0.032  0.601 0.218  0.270 0.746 
1998  0.351  0.084  0.807 0.054  0.034  0.568 0.211  0.285 0.713 
1999  0.320  0.086  1.003 0.060  0.034  0.507 0.235  0.290 0.801 
2000  0.297  0.094  1.556 0.063  0.037  0.582 0.257  0.350 0.893 
2001  0.585  0.099  1.971 0.078  0.047  0.577 0.341  0.387 1.121 
2002  0.353  0.090  1.215 0.067  0.044  0.593 0.355  0.344 1.003 
2003  0.299  0.079  0.787 0.053  0.041  0.505 0.317  0.305 0.865 
2004  0.363  0.080  0.783 0.056  0.031  0.518 0.327  0.207 0.788 
2005  0.347  0.103  0.958 0.054  0.038  0.498 0.211  0.240 0.810 
2006  0.453  0.100  0.868 0.059  0.034  0.409 0.274  0.257 0.851 
2007  0.512  0.107  0.622 0.069  0.044  0.501 0.320  0.305 0.857 
Average  0.388  0.093  0.945 0.062  0.037  0.551 0.268  0.303 0.855 
Notes: The table presents year-by-year the standard deviation of the estimated coefficients for the 
lending, risk and profitability equations. In each equation capitalization (capit.), liquidity (liq.) or 
market power (m.p.) are the smoothing variables of the policy rate.  
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Note: The graphs present frequency distributions of coefficient estimates on the H-statistic, as obtained from the 
estimation of Equation (4), for the United States and the euro area. 
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Distribution of coefficients on the monetary policy variable obtained from the lending 
equation 
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Interest rate smoothed by market power 
 
Note: The graphs present frequency distributions of coefficient estimates on the interest rate variable obtained from the 
lending equation, when the interest rate is smoothed by liquidity, capitalization or market power of banks, 
respectively. The first graph presents the frequency distribution of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
when smoothed by capitalization. The two lines present the normal and the actual distribution of the coefficients, 
respectively. Confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates for the four graphs are (0.280)-(0.747), (-0.462)-(-
0.193), (-0.545)-(-0.101) and (-0.567)-(-0.094). 
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Distribution of coefficients on the monetary policy variable obtained from the credit risk 
equation 
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Interest rate smoothed by market power
 
Note: The graphs present frequency distributions of coefficient estimates on the interest rate variable obtained from the 
lending equation, when the interest rate is smoothed by liquidity, capitalization or market power of banks, 
respectively. The first graph presents the frequency distribution of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
when smoothed by capitalization. The two lines present the normal and the actual distribution of the coefficients, 
respectively. Confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates for the four graphs are (0.210)-(0.756), (-0.070)-




Working Paper Series No 1233
August 2010 45Figure 4 
Distribution of coefficients on the monetary policy variable obtained from the profitability 
equation 
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Interest rate smoothed by market power
 
Note: The graphs present frequency distributions of coefficient estimates on the interest rate variable obtained from the 
lending equation, when the interest rate is smoothed by liquidity, capitalization or market power of banks, 
respectively. The first graph presents the frequency distribution of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
when smoothed by capitalization. The two lines present the normal and the actual distribution of the coefficients, 
respectively. Confidence intervals for the coefficient estimates for the four graphs are (0.201)-(0.660), (-0.273)-
(0.194), (-0.200)-(0.247), (-0.279)-(0.233). 
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